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ABSTRACT
A GIS BASED ANALYSIS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
Hakan Ümit
M.S. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Bahar Y. Kara
September 2002
Transportation of hazardous materials (hazmats) has been calling attention of
regulators, hazmat carriers, environmentalist groups and academia for many
years. In the hazmat literature, there exists two different hazmat transportation
problems for two important decision maker groups. The problem of the first
group, namely the regulators, is to minimize the ‘risk’ that is generated by the
hazmat carriers. The problem of the second group, namely the hazmat carriers,
is to select the routes that minimize their transportation costs. However, there
exists another group of Decision Maker that needs to satisfy both of the
objectives (transportation ‘risk’ and costs), which in most cases conflict
mutually.
In this study, we propose solutions to the hazmat transportation problem from
both government’s and a hazmat producer and supplier firm’s point of view.
We also introduce a new decision-maker type that has been neglected in the
hazmat literature.
Keywords: Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Geographical Information
Systems (GIS)
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ÖZET
FARKLI BAKIS AÇILARINDAN TEHLIKELI MADDE
TASIMACILIGI IÇIN COGRAFI BILGI SISTEMLERI TABANLI
BIR ANALIZ
Hakan Ümit
Endüstri Mühendisligi Yüksek Lisans
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Bahar Y. Kara
Eylül 2002
Tehlikeli madde tasimaciligi yillardir resmi otorite, tehlikeli madde tasiyici
firmalar, çevreci gruplar ve bilim çevrelerinin dikkatini önemli ölçüde çeken
bir konu olmustur. Tehlikeli madde tasimaciligi literatüründe iki önemli karar
verici grubun iki ayri problemi yer almaktadir. Birinci grup yani resmi
otoritelerin problemi tehlikeli madde tasiyanlarin çevreye karsi yarattigi ‘risk’i
enazlamaktir. Ýkinci grup yani, tasiyici firmalarin problemi ise kendi tasima
maliyetlerini enazlayan güzergahlari seçmektir. Ancak literatürde yer almayan
ve çogunlukla birbiriyle çelisen bu iki amaca (tasima ‘risk’ ve maliyetleri)
sahip olan baska bir karar verici grup da bulunmaktadir.
Bu çalismada hükümet ve tehlikeli madde üretici bir firmanin tehlikeli madde
tasimaciligi problemine çözümler önerilmektedir. Ayrica çalismada,
literatürde simdiye kadar ihmal edilmis yeni bir karar verici grup
tanitilmaktadir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tehlikeli Madde Tasimaciligi, Cografi Bilgi Sistemleri
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INTRODUCTION
In today’s world, one of the most fundamental needs to provide the quality of
our lives is hazardous materials. Hazmats, or dangerous goods, include
explosives, gases, flammable liquids and solids, oxidizing substances,
poisonous and infectious substances, radioactive materials, corrosive
substances and hazardous wastes. Hazardous materials are processed in
petroleum refineries, chemical processing plants and nuclear power plants.
Furthermore, the transportation of hazmats from industrial facilities to the
consumers or other facilities has been very common. Dangerous goods can be
extremely harmful to the environment and to the human health, since exposure
to their toxic chemical ingredients may lead to injury or death of plants,
animals and humans.
It is estimated that over 40 million tons of hazardous materials are consumed
and circulated annually in Turkey. This poses a great risk over the society and
the environment as we infer from previous hazmat transportation accidents
that have occurred in Turkey as well as in many other countries in the world.
Therefore, hazmat transportation problem has become a very delicate issue, by
the strict influences and requirements of the regulators (governments),
environmentalists, public and the media. Moreover, we see that the problem
has been a matter of responsibility for many hazmat producers, suppliers and
carriers in the recent years.
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Hazmat logistics has been a very active area of research: Transportation
Science devoted an issue to hazmat logistics in 1991 and Transportation
Research Record published two special issues in 1988 and 1989. The major
concerns in hazmat logistics are the risks associated with them, the spatial
distribution of risks, and the costs incurred during the management process.
In this study, we bring solutions to hazmat transportation problem, both from a
government’s and a hazmat supplier’s point of view, specific to Turkey. We
focus on petroleum products, as they constitute a major position of the hazmat
transportation in Turkey.
In the next chapter, we give the status of hazmat transportation in Turkey.
Hazmat transport regulations, the magnitude of the petroleum products and
previous hazmat accidents in Turkey are the main topics of this chapter. In
Chapter 3, we present the state-of-the-art literature in hazmat transportation.
We give a brief summary of the previous studies in four sections for
convenience including the explanation of the risk definitions that were used in
the previous models. Chapter 4 consists of the definition of the problem in this
study. We present the structure of the problem with all parameters, and state
the problem in detail within Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we present the solution
methodology that we employ to solve the problem. Then we discuss our
computational results in the remainder of this chapter. In Chapter 6 we
approach the hazmat transportation problem from a completely different point
of view. We propose solutions to “Hazardous Network Design Problem” by
making use of three heuristics we developed. Finally, we discuss the results of
all heuristics at the end of Chapter 6. To give a brief summary of our study, we
present our conclusions, contributions and future research directions in
Chapter 7.
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HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION IN
TURKEY
Turkey, as a developing country, is on her way to become an industrialized
country for many years. As a natural result, the use of hazardous materials has
been a priority not only because of the requirements of industrialization but
also because of the lifestyle we pursue in our daily life.
Among hundreds of hazmat types, over 28 million tons of petroleum products,
which can be considered as hazardous materials, are consumed and circulated
in the country every year. Expert ideas from State Statistics Institute certify
that hazardous petroleum products such as; Refinery fuel gas, LPG, naphtha,
gasoline, jet fuel, solvent, diesel oil, asphalt and fuel oil constitute the majority
(above %80) of total hazardous materials in Turkey. As the magnitude of
petroleum products in Turkey is significant enough to incorporate in a study,
we focus on petroleum products, which can be considered as hazardous
materials.
The principal way of shipping hazardous materials is highway transportation
in Turkey. There are government institutions which deal with the Regulation
of Transportation of Hazardous Materials in Turkey. In 1976, General
Directorate of Highways has published the Regulation of Transportation of
Hazardous Materials on Highways. The regulation consists of the following:
 General definition of carrying hazardous materials and transportation types
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 Transportation vehicles and their special containers & tanks
 Classification of Hazardous Materials
 General Transportation conditions (loading limits of the vehicles, vehicle
specifications and attributes, usage of special signs to distinguish vehicles
etc.)
This regulation is still valid but said to be obsolete by both the government and
the industry.
There is also an international agreement, published by United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, called ADR-European Agreement,
concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road. This
regulation may be regarded as a more extended & updated version of Turkish
Hazmat Transportation Regulation. In 1994, Turkish Ministry of
Transportation has appealed ADR to the Parliament in order to become party
of this agreement however, the corresponding commission of the Parliament is
still working on the proposal.
In addition to the hazmat transport regulations, there is a general traffic
regulation in Turkey. Even though it is for general transportation, it does
include hazmat transportation. There is a special topic for commercial drivers:
 Commercial drivers can not drive more than 9 hours in total and non-stop
5 hours in a 24 hours period,
 In case of a non-stop five-hour drive, the driver must take at least one
break of 30 minutes,
 Hazmat trucks can not exceed the speed limits of 30 km/hr in urban areas,
50 km/hr in rural areas, and 60 km/hr on the motorways.
Chapter 2. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION IN TURKEY
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Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources determines policies
concerning energy and natural resources. Turkish petroleum industry activities
in terms of exploring, refining and pricing of the petroleum products, issuing
import and export permits and all other legal, economical and engineering
issues have to be approved by this office.
There are three major oil producer & suppliers operating in Turkey; two of
them owned by foreign investors and the other is a formerly state owned
company. On the other hand there are five petroleum refineries currently
supplying these petroleum companies. The refineries will be covered in the
next section more extensively.
 2.1 Petroleum Refineries in Turkey
There are five petroleum refineries in Turkey, which produce & supply
petroleum products to the fuel companies and hundreds of gas stations in the
country. In Turkey, 27 million tons of crude oil is refined annually, where 23.8
million tons of this crude oil is imported from several countries such as Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Egypt.
Crude Oil Refined Annually
(Million-Tons)
TÜPRAS – Izmit (Derince) Refinery 8.5
TÜPRAS – Izmir (Aliaga) Refinery 11
TÜPRAS – Kirikkale Refinery 3.2
TÜPRAS – Batman Refinery 0.86
ATAS – Mersin Refinery 3.5
Table 2-1: Annual Amount of Refined Crude Oil in Turkish Refineries
Table 2-1 indicates the petroleum refineries, currently producing & supplying
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petroleum products in Turkey. Refineries in Izmir and Izmit, which belong to
TÜPRAS, and ATAS – Mersin Refinery, which is owned by foreign
companies (BP, Shell, and Conoco), are located on the coasts. Kirikkale
Refinery, one of the refineries, which is located on land, is fed with crude oil
flowing through the pipeline that originates from the southern part of the
country. Batman Refinery has its own oil wells.
The location of the refinery plants, the strategic position of industrialized
zones and the population density difference of west and east parts of Turkey
indicate that the majority of petroleum products is consumed in the west and
mid parts of the country. Hence we may expect the hazmat traffic density in
the west and mid part of Turkey to be more than the eastern part. The hazmat
traffic density however constitutes a disadvantageous situation, as we infer
from accident statistics and hazmat accident news in the national newspapers.
 2.2 Hazmat Accidents in Turkey
In Turkey, most of the petroleum products are transported on the highways,
which brings out a potential risk over the society and the environment.
According to State Statistics Institute data (1999), in Turkey there are 52
fatalities and 1244 injuries per 100,000 vehicles. Again per 100,000 vehicles
there are 15 fatalities and 1030 injuries in Germany and 13 fatalities and 1348
injuries in Japan.
Statistical data also indicates that there is a decrease in the number of fatalities
in traffic accidents in recent years in Turkey. Although the number of fatalities
has decreased by 1600 people between 1990 and 1999, the number of
accidents has increased from 115,295 to 438,338.
Chapter 2. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION IN TURKEY
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Table 2-2a indicates a more detailed Accident and Road Traffic data for
various countries:
A B C D E F G H
JAPAN 850,363 10,372 77,810,000 126,686,000 13 1348 8 828
GERMANY 395,689 7,772 50,609,000 82,037,000 15 1030 9 635
HUNGARY 18,923 1,306 2,706,000 10,092,000 48 912 13 244
KOREA 275,938 10,756 13,083,000 46,430,000 82 3080 23 868
SWEDEN 15,834 580 4,607,000 8,854,000 13 477 7 248
TURKEY 63,515 4,596 8,837,403 64,385,000 52 1244 7 171
Table 2-2a: Road Traffic and Accident Data Comparisons for Various Countries (1999)
A: # of Accidents E: # of Fatalities Per 100,000 Vehicle
B: # of Fatalities F: # of Injuries Per 100,000 Vehicle
C: # of Vehicles G: # of Fatalities Per 100,000 People
D: Population H: # of Injuries Per 100,000 People
Table 2-2b: Key to Table 2-2a
There has been 2623 hazmat accidents, which involve only tankers in 1999.
According to the consequence of the accidents, there is a total fatality of 146
people where 62 of them were drivers, 68 of them were passengers and 16 of
them were third party.
There are many examples of hazmat accidents that took place in Turkey in the
past decade. All of them were carried to headlines in the national newspapers,
in many of them 10-50 people were killed per accident. Some important
hazmat accidents, which may be classified as “serious incidents” are the
following:
1. Bus crashed petroleum tanker in Samsun in 1998; resulted with 20
fatalities; fuel leakage out of the tanker caused explosion.
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2. LPG loaded vehicle crashed a bus in Eskisehir in 1998; resulted with 10
fatalities and 20 injuries.
3. Diesel loaded tanker crashed a minibus on Sanliurfa-Birecik road in 1998;
resulted with 20 fatalities.
Accidents involving hazmat vehicles pose great risk for the society and the
environment however, very few hazmat accidents cause a catastrophic event.
If a hazmat vehicle involves an accident that leads to a catastrophe, this
accident is called an “incident”. According to this definition, in case of a
hazmat transport, an undesirable event is an accident that results in the release
of a hazardous substance, which is usually a big spill or a blow-up (Erkut and
Verter 1998). Undesirable event mentioned here is usually expressed as the
number of fatalities that are involved with the accident. However there are also
other ways of expressing an undesirable consequence such as economic losses,
environmental damage etc.
Although there have been a significant number of hazmat accidents in Turkey,
there were few accidents, which fortunately did not lead to an incident. For
instance, in 1997 a hazmat truck caught fire on the highway in southern part of
Turkey, while it was on the road, without any external effect. The accident
zone was closed to traffic for many hours and only after many hours, firemen
could manage to extinguish the fire. In another case, a truck crashed into a
building in a residential zone in Istanbul at midnight, which could have been a
disaster in the metropolis.
In the last ten years, Turkish Government brought many precautions into force
to prevent road accidents. These regulations include more effective
punishments and extra control points on highways. In effect, there is a
Chapter 2. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION IN TURKEY
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decrease in the number of fatalities in year 1999, however the accident
frequency data still indicates that our annual accident frequency remains high
above the average, among many countries in the world.
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C h a p t e r  3
STATE-OF-THE-ART IN HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION
The problem of transportation of hazardous materials has been analyzed since
the beginning of 1980s (List et al. 1991). Researchers developed models to
define risk and bring solutions to hazmat transportation problems. We
categorize the hazmat literature into four groups for convenience:
1. Risk definitions that were used in the hazmat literature
2. Routing models that were determined for hazmat transportation problems
3. Different approaches that were brought to the hazmat literature in recent
years
4. Decision-Maker structures in the hazmat literature
Before we go through the next sections, we define some preliminary basics,
which will be used in the remainder of this study.
We represent the existing highway system by a network G=(N, A), where N
denotes the set of nodes and A denotes the set of highway links that connect
the nodes. A shipment of hazmat type m is transported across G from its
origins (o Î N) to its destinations (d Î N).
Chapter 3. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION
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 3.1 Definitions of Risk in the Hazmat Literature
Modeling hazmat transportation problem aims to mitigate the risk that is
exposed to the public and environment, however employing a reasonable and
justifiable risk definition is another matter of consideration. Hence, there are
different definitions of risk in the hazmat literature.
Earlier studies, which began with risk assessment of transporting hazardous
materials, mostly dealt with determining a definition for “risk”. Erkut and
Verter (1995) reviewed hazardous materials logistics extensively and provided
a detailed review of risk models that were used in previous studies. They
examine the idea behind the risk definitions that were used until 1995.
Saccomanno and Chan (1985) define risk as the likelihood of an accident and
measure it by incorporating the relative frequency of truck accidents and
employing two types of random environmental influences (stochastic and
deterministic) which are expressed in probabilistic terms. Stochastic influences
arise as pavement surface condition (wet, dry etc.) and visibility while
deterministic influences are road design characteristics (speed limits of
different types of roads), which are expected to affect general accident rates.
To give a formal definition of this risk model, let P denote a path between an
origin-destination (o-d) pair and sp denote the probability of having an
incident on a unit road segment on link s. The following is a basic assumption
in the hazmat literature:
Assumption 1: sp  is constant on link s.
It is possible to divide a link that violates this assumption into sub-links, each
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with constant incident probability. Thus the probability of having an incident
on unit segment k of link s is s
k
s pp
1)1( -- . Let 'sp  denote the probability of
having an incident on link s and sl denote the length of link s. Observe that,
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Given that the incident probabilities are in the order of 810-  (for North
America), the following assumption is quite common in the hazmat literature
(Verter and Kara 2002):
Assumption 2: 0@isp for 1>i .
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' . Without loss of generality, let { }rP ,,2,1 K= .
The Incident Probability of a single shipment on path P is:
Based on assumptions 1 and 2, the incident probability of path P simplifies to:
Pijawka et al. (1985) also used hazmat accident probability to define risk in the
same manner. For each route, they calculated the number of accidents by a
hazmat carrier expected per year by multiplying the accident rate by the
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number of total miles of exposure in the hazmat transport.
On the other hand, Abkowitz et al. (1992) employed the same risk definition
with the name of Release-causing Accident Likelihood. They derived the
accident rates based on truck accident rates involving hazmat movements that
appear in the U.S. highway network. Release probabilities are based on
various container configurations and highway locations.
Population exposure  is another definition of risk in the hazmat literature.
According to this risk definition, the area within l-neighborhood of a point c
on link (i,j) is under potential risk (Batta and Chiu 1988), where l varies for
different hazmat types.
Figure 3-1: Population Exposure of a Single Truck at Point c on Link (i,j)
The idea behind population exposure is assuming that the probability of death
for an individual within l-neighborhood of a point c on link (i,j) due to the
incident is one (Erkut and Verter 1995).
A danger zone of a single hazmat incident is defined with a circle of l radius,
which is centred at the position where the accident takes place. l, is the impact
radius of the hazmat that is being carried, which may change according to the
hazmat type. The exposure zone of a link is the union of the danger zones
l
l
ci j
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along that link. Finally, the number of people within an exposure zone is the
population exposure of the corresponding link. This may also be regarded as a
truck drawing a “risk corridor” on both sides of a link as it moves along that
link.
Figure 3-2: Population Exposure of a Single Truck on Link (i,j)
Representation of the spatial distribution of population, within the
geographical region of concern, is another critical issue in hazmat transport
risk assessment. Recently Erkut and Verter (1995) proposed a model, in which
population centres are represented as polygons rather than points. Let
sd denote the population density around a unit road segment on link s. The
following is a common assumption in the hazmat literature:
Assumption 3: sd is constant on link s.
Let msC , denote the number of people living within danger zone around link s,
and ml denote the impact radius of hazmat type m.
Denote the exposure zone of hazmat type m around link s as msEZ , . Let
l
l
ci j
l
smms dC
2
, pl=
Chapter 3. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION
15
msC , represent the number of people living in msEZ ,  (Observe that, when link s
is a straight line )2( 2, mmssms ldC pll += ).
The population exposure on path P is:
                                                          å
=
r
s
msC
1
,
When the links are not straight line, then we need to calculate the area within
the exposure zone by integration, which may be time-consuming. There is
however an easier way of calculating population exposure when Geographical
Information Systems (GIS) tools are utilized.
Classic or traditional definition of risk arises as Societal Risk (accident
probability multiplied by the number of people in the danger zone) in the
hazmat literature. Several authors preferred to use this risk definition as it
combines both incident probability and number of people exposed, which in
most cases become more effective and justifiable.
Based on the assumptions mentioned above, the societal risk of path P is:
Pijawka et al. (1985) named Societal Risk as Population-at-Risk Factor and
multiplied hazmat accident probability by Population at Risk/Mile.
Abkowitz et al. (1992) also applied the traditional risk definition in their study
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as it is consistent with the definition of risk used in federal routing criteria
guidelines by U.S. Department of Transportation. What distinguishes their
application is that they used Geographical Information system (GIS) in
calculation of population exposed, in their study.
Alp (1995) modeled the hazmat transportation problem with the traditional
definition of risk, however he made use of fault tree and event tree analysis to
determine hazmat accident probabilities. A fault tree shows how a system can
fail whereas an event tree is used to identify and quantify possible outcomes of
an event.
There are two other risk definitions that were used in the hazmat literature:
Perceived Risk (Abkowitz et al. 1992) and Conditional Risk (Glickman 1991).
However, Erkut and Verter (1998) argued against using the conditional risk
and perceived risk models since they violate three axioms that need to be
satisfied by a risk model for hazmat transport. These axioms are: monotonicity
axiom for path evaluation models, optimality principle for path selection
models and monotonicity axiom for risk models.
 3.2 Routing Models in the Hazmat Literature
In the hazmat literature, we observe that prevailing studies modeled the
routing problem with a single objective which in most cases appear to be the
minimization of the total risk exposed to the public.
List et al. (1991a) surveyed an extensive research on hazardous materials
transportation considering Risk Analysis, Routing/Scheduling and Facility
Location. In their study, it has been stated that the earliest studies dealing with
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multiple objectives belong to Shobrys (1981) and Robbins (1981).
Saccomanno and Chan (1985) also dealt with multiple objectives to solve the
hazmat transportation problem. The authors discussed three distinctive routing
strategies for the road transportation of hazardous materials which are;
minimize total risk (three types of damage which are represented as dollars,
number of fatality & injuries and zone impact), minimize the accident
likelihood (relative frequency of accidents on selected road links) and
minimize operating truck costs. Each routing strategy was applied to the
Toronto road network, and recommended safe routes were analyzed for cost-
effectiveness for a wide range of environmental conditions. Two important
aspects emerge from the cost-effectiveness analysis: (a) minimum risk routing
strategy produces net economic gains in the form of enhanced safety, and (b)
significant trade-offs are of fundamental concern to the implementation of this
type of safety enhancement strategy for the transportation of hazardous
materials.
Abkowitz at al. (1992) considered five objectives and determined two extreme
route results, i.e. determination of minimum cost and minimum risk routes.
Furthermore, the authors examined the routes that could provide intermediate
solutions by assigning weights (between 0-1) to the objectives of risk and cost.
However, very few combinations were presented in the study.
Alidi (1996) modeled the problem of petrochemical waste management with
eight objectives. The solution methodology is goal programming where goal
priorities were determined via Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to be
applied by the decision-maker.  The author provided a hypothetical example in
the study.
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Iakovou et al. (1999) and Iakovou (2001) present the development of a
strategic multiobjective network flow model, allowing for risk analysis and
routing with multiple commodities, modalities (vessels) and origin-destination
pairs. Two objectives are involved in the problem; minimization of the total
cost and total risk. Risk was defined as the spatial empirical probability
distribution of past spills along with the total dollar cost estimate of damage
inflicted by each specific historical spill. Risk calculation was supported by a
geographical information system (GIS). The required data contains the
location of spill, the amount of the spill, the type of the substance spilled, the
date and time of the release, wind time series, and the extent of the cleanup of
the spill. The solution process was initialized by two solutions obtained from
two problems namely, minimization of cost and minimization of risk. Once
the non-dominated basic solutions are determined, the decision-maker is asked
to identify a linear combination of the two objectives. The development of an
interactive solution methodology is also presented with its implementation via
a World Wide Web-based software package. An illustrative application for the
Gulf of Mexico is also provided.
There are also some studies in the hazmat literature that consider hazmat
transportation problem together with a location aspect.
Revelle et al. (1991) considered the hazardous waste management problem by
incorporating routing and siting components with two objectives: the
minimization of total transportation burden and the minimization of total
perceived risk. Transportation burden was accounted in ton-miles and
perceived risk as tons-past-people or people-tons.
List et al. (1991b) presented a combined routing/siting model for making
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routing decisions and siting decisions for waste treatment facilities. Risk, cost
and risk equity is considered jointly in a multi-objective framework, seeking
pareto optimal solutions that combine them. A simplified form of the model
was applied to the Capital District of the State of New York. The case study
considers a single type of hazardous waste.
Current et al. (1995) proposed a multiobjective mixed-integer model to
minimize risk, equity and cost of locating facilities and transportation
throughout a given network. Five objectives are involved in the study
including minimization of; a) the total transportation risk, b) risk generated
from locating a facility at a particular node, c) maximum transportation
exposure faced by any individual, d) minimization of the maximum facility
risk faced by any individual and e) minimization of the total transportation,
facility and operating costs of the system. In the study, 12 non-inferior
solutions were generated using the weighting method.
Most recently, Giannikos (1998) addressed hazardous materials transportation
and location problem with a multiobjective model. Objectives employed in
this study are the same with the objectives that are used in the hazmat
literature. The author use goal programming to model the problem, where a
target is specified for each goal so as to find a solution that comes as close as
possible to these targets. To mitigate the unsatisfactory results of the weighted
goal programming model, the author changed the assumption of  “any
marginal deviation is of equal importance no matter how distant it is from a
target” to “any deviational variable with respect to its target value is penalized
according to a constant marginal penalty”.
In almost all studies in the hazmat literature there have been single/multi
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objective models to be solved individually or simultaneously. We observe that
there is an unavoidable multiple objective case to be considered in many
hazmat transportation problems. Regardless of the decision maker type, which
will be covered more extensively in section 3.4, there is a multiobjective
situation in many hazmat problems.
 3.3 Different Recent Approaches in the Hazmat Literature
Since the hazmat transportation models, risk definitions and solution
methodology could not respond the requirements of real life problems,
approaches that are more accurate and useful modifications were brought into
the hazmat literature in recent years.
An early distinguished study by Erkut (1995) discusses about a previous
model which finds hazardous materials routes proposed by Sivakumar et al.
(1993). Erkut stated that the model violates a monotonicity axiom for path
evaluation and selection models. Small numerical examples were given in
order to demonstrate the violation results in the selection of solutions that may
be undesirable in the hazardous materials routing.
Erkut and Verter (1998) question two traditional assumptions in the hazmat
literature. One basic assumption is that, residents living inside a circle at an
incident site, with a given impact radius, will experience the same undesirable
consequence, and residents living outside the circle will experience no
undesirable consequence. According to the authors, this assumption is
inevitable since the data necessary for an accurate assessment of risks to
humans do not exist for many hazmats. As long as one is interested in the
relative risks of different paths, the danger zone approximation will provide
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valid comparisons.
The second basic assumption is that the products of incident probabilities
equal to zero, which is Assumption 2 mentioned in Section 3.1. It was shown
that this approximation does not result in significant inaccuracies in the
estimation of incident probabilities.
In many multiobjective hazmat transportation problems, it is necessary to
provide a set of alternative paths. This is due to the case of a possible
infeasibility of the “best” route(s) (road construction or certain roads closed to
hazmat traffic temporarily) that is selected by the carrier.
Akgün et al. (2000) considered the problem of finding a number of spatially
dissimilar paths between an origin and destination. They state that a number of
dissimilar paths can be useful in solving capacitated flow problems or in
selecting routes for hazardous materials. A critical discussion of three existing
methods; Iterative Penalty Method (IPM), Gateway Shortest Paths (GSPs) and
Minimax Method is offered for the generation of spatially dissimilar paths.
Computational experience using these methods and the advantages and
disadvantages of each method are also reported. They concluded that each of
three existing methods has a number of drawbacks. An alternative solution
technique is proposed as a p-dispersion problem. If a large number of suitable
candidate paths can be generated, then the application of the p-dispersion
model is said to be an effective way to solve the problem.
A more recent study that were brought into the hazmat literature by Kara and
Verter (2000) is distinguished from the rest of the hazmat literature. The study
approaches to the hazmat transportation problem from a regulator’s point of
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view, which makes use of closing certain links of the road network to hazmat
transportation in order to mitigate the transport risk. Kara and Verter (2000)
demonstrated each Decision-Maker’s (DM) dependent situation in a unique
way in their study.
According to this approach, the regulator identifies the allowable links in the
network for hazmat transportation to mitigate the risk associated with the
hazmat transportation. The carriers try to maximize their utility, namely
minimize their transportation costs by selecting the shortest routes in the
remaining network. Governments do not have the authority of determining the
routes for the carriers, but they can as well close certain links in order to
indirectly influence the carriers to “safer” routes. Kara and Verter proposed a
bilevel model, which has two different objectives from Government and
Carrier’s point of view respectively.
 3.4 Decision Maker Structures in the Hazmat Literature
We observe that there are two main Decision-Makers (DM) that were used in
the hazmat literature: the regulators (the government) and the hazmat carriers.
As the hazmat transportation problem emerged from mitigating societal and
environmental risk, the problem was modeled from a regulator’s point of view
in most of the studies. The main attribute of this DM is that a regulator has the
only objective of minimizing risk and does not hold the authority of dictating
certain routes to hazmat carriers. Studies until Kara and Verter’s (2000) new
approach tried to solve the hazmat transportation problem from regulator’s
viewpoint, however the justification of the previous models were questionable.
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One important remark in the hazmat maritime transportation is that a maritime
regulator (coastal guard) holds the jurisdiction of dictating certain routes to the
hazmat carriers (Iakovou et al. 1999).
The second DM type represents the hazmat carriers. The basic assumption
with this DM is that a hazmat carrier will base its routing policy on selecting
the paths which minimize the total transportation cost. Therefore, the objective
of this DM happens to be minimizing transportation costs.
To sum up, we can conclude that most of the studies in the hazmat literature
approach the problem from the regulator’s point of view in the sense that the
methodologies developed aimed at minimizing the risk (or some
combinations). However, the actual shipments are done by carriers for whom
minimizing the risk exposed to the people and the environment is not an issue
unless they are forced to do so. There are however, some studies that
suggested multiobjective models for the use of hazmat carriers, which were
mentioned in section 3.2. With these two Decision-Makers, multicriteria
approaches seem to be irrelevant since the DMs of the multiobjective model
are two different DMs. To the best of our knowledge, none of the studies in
the hazmat literature have identified or clarified this property.
During our analysis of hazmat transportation problem we observe that there is
another type of DM in the hazmat transportation area, which has been
neglected in the literature so far. In the next chapter, we will present the new
DM together with its problem specifications.
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C h a p t e r  4
PROBLEM DEFINITION
In the previous chapter, we have discussed the DM types that took place in the
hazmat literature. In this chapter, we will introduce a new DM type, which we
argue that it has been omitted in the hazmat literature. We conducted a joint
research with one of the biggest petroleum companies in the country, Shell
Turkey. Our new DM happens to be the “missing” DM in the hazmat literature
who will use all these multicriteria type of approaches.
Before we go through our case study, we examine the structure of the
company, as well as its jurisdictions and requirements.
 4.1 Company Structure
Shell is the second largest petroleum products producer & supplier in the
world with over $70 billion total fixed assets and the third largest oil company
in Turkey. Shell has two main customer groups in Turkey:
1. Commercial customers, who purchase Shell products in bulks for their
own business such as companies in agricultural, construction and
transportation  (aviation and maritime) industries.
2. Retailers, who constitute the largest portion of total Shell customers
(%75). There are currently 575 retailers, namely gas stations throughout
Turkey.
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Shell Turkey supplies 2,000,000 tons of petroleum products annually where
1,500,000 tons are supplied to 575 gas stations. There is a variety of products
which consists of:
1. Unleaded Gasoline-Extra
2. Diesel-Extra
3. Diesel
4. Gasoline
5. Gasoline-Extra
6. Unleaded Gasoline
7. LPG
There are eleven supply points currently serving Shell where, three of them are
refineries and eight of them are terminal points which are usually located on
the coasts. Figure 4-1 indicates the location of the eleven supply points.
Figure 4-1: Supply Points of Shell in Turkey
Shell customers have two delivery options for the products they purchase.
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They can either pick up their purchase by using their own trucks and drivers or
send an order to Shell to do the delivery for them. The details about these
transport modes are as follows:
1. Customer own pick-up: Most of Shell customers (%70) have their own
tanker-trucks. These trucks must suffice the requirements of Turkish
Hazardous Materials Transport Regulation and must have a safe pass
sticker, after being approved by Shell. Gas station owners, who prefer to
use their own trucks for product shipments, transport them at their own
risk. Shell is not responsible for any risk in this transportation mode.
2. Shell Fleet: Shell provides shipping service to its customers since 1998,
with three subcontractor transport companies. The structure of the
business is as follows:
Investments such as trucks, hiring drivers etc. belong to the subcontractor
transport companies, namely the hauliers. The fleet consists of 43 trucks of
various sizes, which have been assigned to nine supply points by Shell to serve
between various o-d pairs. Although there are eleven supply points, Shell
assigned its fleet to nine of these supply points. Table 4-1 indicates the supply
points and the number of trucks that are assigned to these supply points by
Shell.
A typical delivery process is as follows: Hauliers,
 take the orders and the routes to follow
 are told about the specific road links to avoid & to follow in special
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occasions1 and;
 are given the delivery time2 (interval) & place by Shell.
      Supply Point Type # of Trucks
Assigned
1. Ýstanbul-Ambarli
2. Ýzmit-Derince
3. Ýzmir-Aliaga
4. Antalya
5. Samsun
6. Trabzon
7. Hopa
8. Mersin
9. Kirikkale
10. Ýskenderun
11. Batman
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Terminal
Refinery
Refinery
Terminal
Refinery
5
13
8
3
1
3
1
4
5
-
-
Table 4-1: Supply Points of Shell
Shell pays the hauliers on the basis of per kilometers travelled and fixed costs,
which may be regarded as depreciation costs. The fare of per kilometers
traveled varies for each haulier, since three of the hauliers are independent
companies.
To evaluate the performance of the hauliers and the drivers, Shell created two
evaluation systems called Drivers’ League (DL) and Hauliers’ League (HL).
In HL, performance of each haulier is determined among particular weighted
                                                
1 In case of an exogenous change (an accident or a closed road) within a specified route, the drivers are
advised not to choose a tunnel as an alternative, but to follow a safer link such as a highway.
2 Every gas station has a different receiving time interval of the purchased goods.
Shell Fleet
Customer
Own
Pick-up
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criteria such as the number of traffic accidents/month, average speed of a
shipment, customer evaluations and haulier’s monthly accident reporting
performance. Evaluation in DL is in the same fashion, however there are other
criteria such as; maintenance of the vehicles, fuel consumption and potential
accident reports and “near misses” (a near miss is an accident that a driver is
just about to involve).
There are some constraints for this transportation mode:
1. Shipments must be made within 24 hours
2. The tanks fixed on the trucks are physically divided into compartments of
various capacities. No half-filled compartments are allowed due to
security and economic reasons.
3. Multiple destinations for a shipment is not desired due to set-up costs such
as paperwork, connecting the hoses to the trucks etc.
 4.2 The Problem
Each haulier undertakes the consequences (all costs of a damage; economic
loss of goods that are being transported and third party damages) of a hazmat
transport incident. This situation calls for the following question as Shell is not
responsible for economic losses in the hazmat transportation: Do we still have
a hazmat transportation problem?
Yes. Although the cost of an incidence is taken care of by the hauliers, Shell
does not totally ignore the risk exposed to public and the environment. There
are some reasons:
1. Shell’s way of doing energy business is in a responsible manner
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2. The international structure of the company necessitates requirements such
as HSE-Health Security and Environment policies
3. The fleet consists of Shell branded trucks, which means that Shell will be
accused by public and media in case of an incident.
In addition to the transportation risk, Shell requires the transportation costs to
be economically feasible as well since profitability is another important
objective of the company. Thus, Shell wants to reduce the impact of a possible
incident (minimize the risk exposed to public and environment), however
keeping the transportation costs economically feasible is at least of equal
importance.
Shell is the leader of the game and holds the jurisdiction. Hauliers’ role here is
like an “employee” of Shell because they do not hold the authority of making
the routing decisions. When it comes to the costs associated with an incident,
hauliers do care about it, because in case of an accident, they will have to
cover all the loss instead of Shell.
This situation allows us to introduce a New Decision-Maker, which considers
both objectives (“risk” and cost) that are not in mutual competition. The
reason that we need to introduce a new DM is that, Shell’s case does not fit in
the DM structures that currently exist in the hazmat literature.
When we consider the traditional DM type that represents the hazmat carriers,
we realize that Shell’s situation does not correspond to this DM type. Because
Shell is not the actual hazmat carrier in our problem. Considering the
government as an alternative DM to suit Shell’s case we again understand that
Shell and its hauliers do not reflect the situation in that model. Regarding Shell
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and its hauliers’ dependent relations to suit Kara and Verter’s (2000) model,
we observe that there is a basic property with the regulators that, a regulator
can not dictate the carriers the paths to be followed. However, we already
mentioned that Shell could actually dictate its sub contractor companies which
routes to be taken.
The new decision-maker represents the companies producing and supplying
hazardous materials but not doing the actual transportation business with the
company facilities. The attributes of this new decision maker is the following:
1. The hazmat supplier company is not involved in the transportation
business, but has them done by sub contractor firms.
2. Sub contractor firms determine the fares according to per kilometers
traveled.
3. The hazmat producer company holds the jurisdiction over the sub
contractor firms, such as being able to dictate the routes to be followed
4. The damage costs of hazmat transportation belong to the hauliers.
In summary, the hazmat transportation problem for Shell is, to minimize the
total “risk” of the hazmat transportation in consideration with keeping the
hauling costs economically feasible.
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C h a p t e r  5
SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In Chapter 4, we argued that Shell’s situation would not fit in the traditional
DM type, which represents hazmat carriers. Moreover, we introduced a new
decision maker type who does not actually do the hazmat transportation but
hires sub contractor firms to do the transportation and undertake the cost of
damage involved in the transportation business.
There are two objectives in the problem, which are to minimize total
transportation risk and minimize total transportation cost. As these two
objectives are to be considered simultaneously for Shell, we need to develop a
model that contains both of the objectives.
Let us start from the simplest transportation problem where we have only one
objective function without any constraints other than the flow balance. For a
single o-d pair, it is obvious that the problem is a shortest path problem, which
may have one or more optimal solution(s).
When we have the transportation problem with n distinct o-d pairs, we need to
consider every single problem concurrently to get an optimal solution. This
means that we have n independent shortest path problems to be solved
simultaneously. The problems are independent since the only constraint set is
the flow balance, so there are no coupling constraints. Hence, we can solve the
transportation problem that consists of n different o-d pairs, by solving each
problem as a single o-d shortest path problem separately or sequentially.
Chapter 5. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
32
The problem we have in this study necessitates multicriteria consideration.
Therefore, we need to incorporate multiple objectives into our problem, since
single objective shortest path problem would not suit our DM’s purposes.
The studies dealing with multiple objectives in the hazmat literature mainly
focused on two methodologies in solving their problems: Weighting Method
and Goal Programming.
List et al. (1991), Revelle et al. (1991), Abkowitz et al. (1992), Current et al.
(1995) and Iakovou et al. (1999) calculated weighted combination of the
objectives and solved the problem with the new weighted objective function.
Alidi (1996) and Giannikos (1998) employed goal programming to tackle the
multiobjective situation in hazmat transportation problem.
Goal programming necessitates expert user (DM) interaction such as, setting
target values and ranking the targets in order of relative importance etc. Our
discussions with company representatives regarding Shell’s interaction to the
problem led us to employ weighted combination of the objectives and present
the corresponding results. Therefore, we use weighting method to solve the
hazmat transportation problem in our study.
Let us consider single/multiple o-d pair(s) with multiple objectives in a
transportation problem. These objectives are expressed in different units, e.g.
total risk (number of people living around a link within a specified distance l)
of the paths and total cost (length of a link) of the paths, both to be minimized.
These two units of measure can be considered as individual arc impedances
when a single objective shortest path problem is of concern. Aggregating these
two arc impedances (after being normalized) will yield a new value f, which
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can be considered as a new arc impedance. Based on minimizing total “cost”
of paths, f, we again have a single objective shortest path problem. For a
particular aggregation of two arc impedances, we have:
ijijij rwlwf 21 +=
where, iw  is a weight, [ ]1,0=iw  and å =
i
iw 1, to represent the importance of
arc cost values ijl , length of link (i,j) and ijr , risk value of link (i,j).
ijf becomes the new arc impedance in our problem.
As both of the cost functions are expressed in different units of measure, we
normalize the cost attributes of each link before the calculation of each
weighted combination. To express both arc impedances in a common unit, we
divided each value of an arc by the sum of the corresponding cost value.
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the DM’s requirements and goals. Therefore, we present several weighted
combination results to the DM to decide which combination best suits their
purposes. Previous methodology of solving n independent shortest path
problems is still valid for every weighted combination.
 5.2 Implementation
We have a series of shortest path problems with multiple objectives for
various o-d pairs. The best way to solve the problem is to use Geographical
Information System (GIS). GIS enables us to represent the o-d pairs on their
accurate locations and calculate the arc impedances easily.
We used ESRI’s ArcView GIS 3.1 software package to calculate arc
impedances. Population centers are represented using polygons, which
illustrate real life situations better than in point representation of the
population centers (Erkut and Verter 1995). We use a digitized population
center census division map of Turkey (67 cities), which is available on ESRI’s
web based library. We also obtained a digitized highway map of Turkey from
ISYAM. For each link, we calculated the length in kilometers and the risk
(population exposure) values using GIS tools.
We have a 670-arc and 499-node network, which is the highway network of
Turkey. The (o-d) shipments are between origins o = {Aliaga (Ýzmir), Ambarli
(Ýstanbul), Derince (Ýzmit), Kirikkale, Trabzon, Samsun, Hopa (Artvin), Atas
(Mersin), Antalya} and 562 destinations, which are located on their exact
geographical positions.
We focus only the shipments made by Shell fleet in 2001, as Shell is not
Chapter 5. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
35
responsible for the customer own pick up transportation mode. There is a total
of 1582 shipments made by Shell Fleet, which equals to 586,000 tons of
petroleum products/year. However, we focused only the shipments that are
more than a truck in a year. Therefore, we have 562 shipments of various
sizes.  This equals to 502,988 tons of petroleum products over a year.
The number of shipments from nine supply points is as follows:
ORIGIN
# of
Shipments Demand (tons)
Truck Equivalent
(Truck Cap:
35 Tons)
ALÝAGA
(ÝZMÝR) 108 114,897 3334
AMBARLI
(ÝSTANBUL)
50 115,795 3331
DERÝNCE
(ÝZMÝT) 144 151,975 4409
KIRIKKALE 85 24,592 741
TRABZON 23 9,015 267
SAMSUN 34 13,907 413
HOPA (ARTVÝN) 23 16,786 488
ATAS (MERSÝN) 52 27,952 823
ANTALYA 43 28,067 820
TOTAL 562 502,988 14,626
Table 5-1: Demand Distributed to Different Supply Points (2001)
We use Population Exposure  as our risk measure. We determined l to be 800
meters, as Transport Canada requires evacuation of people residing within 800
meters of an incident site when petroleum products are involved (Verter and
Kara 2002). The impact radius is the same for all hazmats we studied.  The
types of hazmats we have in our study are Diesel-Extra, Diesel, Gasoline,
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Gasoline-Extra, Unleaded Gasoline, and Unleaded Gasoline-Extra.
Our computations are based on solving several groups of shortest path
problems for two different arc impedances and their combinations. A
Minimum Length Path (MinLength) is the path that is determined based on
selecting a shortest path in terms of the kilometers traveled. A Minimum Risk
Path (MinRisk) is the path, which is determined based on selecting a path that
poses the least risk to the public and the environment.
We determined Minimum Risk and Minimum Length paths for each shipment
sequentially. When routing is based on selecting shortest paths, total path
length results of Minimum Length Path solutions constitute a lower bound for
the total path length of all shipments. On the other hand total path risk results
of Minimum Risk Path solutions constitute a lower bound for the total path risk
of the shipments when routing strategy is based on minimizing path risk.
Besides these two extreme case results, we also determined intermediate
results, which come from the weighted combination of the risk and cost
functions.
We used Dijkstra Algorithm implementation provided in the Network Analyst
1.b extension of ArcView GIS 3.1 in our shortest path calculations.
 5.3 Computational Results
For a particular routing criterion, we have two results to be compared by the
DM in order to make a decision. The first one is the total risk of a path and the
second is the total length of a path. For a particular shipment, a Minimum
Length and a Minimum Risk Path are depicted in Figure 5-1.
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In Figure 5-1, observe that the Minimum Length path is 356 km. and exposes
risk to 49,290 people. Same shipment but with different routing criterion,
Minimum Risk path has a length of 379 km. and population exposure of
47,273 people.
Figure 5-1: Aliaga-Çanakkale Shipment
These results illustrate the cost and the exposure of a single-truck. However,
the amount of this particular shipment is 56 trucks/year, so we incorporate the
cost and the exposure of every truck to get a meaningful result. For each
supply point, the corresponding number of trucks of each shipment is
ALÝAGA-ÇANAKKALE SHIPMENT
MinLength Route MinRisk Route
Km: 356
Population Exposure: 49,290
Km: 379
Population Exposure: 47,273
Çanakkale
Aliaga
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multiplied by every shortest path result. Hence, we have two measuring units,
which are Truck-People for the total population exposure and Truck-Km for
the total cost of the paths.
Finally, two extreme case results (Minimum Risk and Minimum Length Paths)
and an equally weighted combination result for all 562 shipments originating
from nine supply points are as follows:
Supply
Minimum Risk Minimum Length
%50 Risk-
%50 Length
Truck People Truck
Km
Truck People Truck
Km
Truck People Truck
Km
ALÝAGA 193,160,611 646,001 195,718,341 626,294 193,716,312 629,703
AMBARLI 402,953,384 184,834 403,451,512 182,881 402,954,936 184,446
DERINCE 338,377,090 665,397 341,032,680 628,517 339,726,605 633,395
KIRIKKALE 32,728,918 218,624 35,521,938 200,260 33,459,920 204,407
TRABZON 6,996,427 48,249 7,317,735 38,102 7,087,512 38,983
SAMSUN 18,612,010 191,962 20,662,113 138,744 20,554,890 139,227
HOPA 4,043,449 72,832 6,778,629 55,907 4,045,563 67,277
ATAS 39,382,299 233,509 40,245,728 228,687 39,687,660 229,331
ANTALYA 8,878,217 88,956 8,942,109 88,208 8,942,109 88,208
TOTAL 1,045,132,405 2,350,364 1,059,670,785 2,187,600 1,050,175,507 2,214,977
Table 5-2: Minimum Risk, Minimum Length and %50Risk-%50Length Results
There is a significant decrease in the total transportation risk, which is equal to
14.5 million truck-people, when Minimum Risk is the routing criterion instead
of Minimum Length. There is a trade-off, which requires total transportation
cost to be increased by 162,764 truck-kms, which is total extra kms to be made
by Shell fleet in a year.
Among 562 shipments, 379 shipments have similar paths, namely 379
shipments have the same path results for either minimum risk or minimum
length routing consideration. To give a ratio, only %33 percent of the
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shipments have dissimilar path results. This also corresponds to 1531 trucks
among 14,626 total trucks.
The shipments, originating from different supply points, differ in terms of their
total path risk and total path cost results. For instance, the difference of total
path risk of MinLength and MinRisk results from supply point AMBARLI is
498,128 truck-people and the corresponding trade-off is 1953 truck-kms.
However, the achievement and the trade-off for the shipments from HOPA are
2,735,180 truck-people and 16,925 truck-kms. Despite the fact that the annual
demand from supply point HOPA is only %14 of the annual demand from
supply point AMBARLI, there is a significant difference between the
achievement and the trade-off values of these two supply point originating
shipments. This is due to the following reasons:
When we compare the extreme case results for each supply point, we see that
geographical position of the supply point as well as its demand points can be
effective to change total risk and total cost results. Even though some supply
points, such as AMBARLI and ALÝAGA are located on the most densely
populated cities (Ýstanbul and Ýzmir respectively) and they provide service to
%25 of Shell Turkey’s market, the achievement (in terms of number of people
that can be saved from potential risk when routing strategy is based on
MinRisk instead of MinLength) is quite low comparing to the supply points
which serve a relatively small market, such as HOPA. This is due to the
allocation of demand points to the supply points and the geographical position
of the o-d pairs. When the distribution of demand points of each supply point
is observed on the map thoroughly, it can be seen that most of the supply
points serve some cluster of the market. For instance, AMBARLI serves only
the European part of Turkey, which results in mostly similar paths for both
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Minimum Length and Minimum Risk routing considerations. On the other
hand, KIRIKKALE which can also be named as the “default” supply point of
Turkey, serves almost all over the country, which results in completely
dissimilar paths for almost every KIRIKKALE based shipment. Thus, we can
conclude that, the allocation of o-d pairs as well as the geographical position
of the allocated supply and demand points affects the results of our analysis. It
is clear from the above results that the o-d assignments of Shell Turkey are
quite effective.
There is another result presented in Table 5-2, which combines risk and cost
functions evenly. %50 Risk-%50 Length saves 9.5 million truck-people with a
quite low trade-off, 27,377 truck-kms, in comparison to the trade-off value of
Minimum Risk Path result.
Altering the weights of the objective functions with new values will result in
new alternatives for the decision-maker. When we assign a %25 of importance
to risk and %75 to cost, we have a 5.1 million truck-people saved with 5,790
truck-kms of trade-off, in comparison to Minimum Length.
%25Risk -%75Length %75Risk-%25Length
Supply
Truck People Truck Km Truck People Truck Km
ALÝAGA 194,332,540 626,986 193,377,479 635,141
AMBARLI 403,346,347 182,966 402,954,934 184,446
DERINCE 340,679,227 629,059 338,626,382 646,552
KIRIKKALE 33,741,943 202,712 32,811,366 212,210
TRABZON 7,317,735 38,102 7,078,508 39,075
SAMSUN 20,647,245 138,767 18,996,600 161,710
HOPA 5,833,629 57,405 4,045,563 67,277
ATAS 39,706,756 229,185 39,392,461 232,762
ANTALYA 8,942,109 88,208 8,883,061 88,705
TOTAL 1,054,547,531 2,193,390 1,046,166,354 2,267,878
Table 5-3: Weighted Combination Results
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The opposite weighted combination result, which is %75 risk-prone, results
with 13.5 million truck-people to be saved for 80,278 truck-kms to trade.
To provide more alternative solutions, we solved our problem for 13 different
combinations, which range from %10 to %90 Risk and %10 to %90 cost.
These 13 results, the trade-off curve of these results and illustrated examples
are presented in Appendix-A, B and C respectively.
From the total transportation risk and total transportation cost results, we
observe that %50Risk-%50Length routing strategy is far better than Minimum
Risk criterion, which was also commented so by our Decision Maker.
Further analysis regarding the achievement and the trade-off for a single truck,
results in more interesting values which is presented in Table 5-4. Considering
Minimum Risk versus Minimum Length results, we already know the total
number of people we can save from potential risk and the total kms we need to
trade to take advantage of this achievement, which are 14.5 million truck-
people and 162,764 truck-km respectively. When we take the average of these
values by dividing total number of truck equivalents, which is 14626, we see
that there is a clear difference between two routing considerations.
We save 649 people from potential risk by only making extra 1.8 kilometres
per truck on the average in %50Risk-%50Length versus MinLength. On the
other hand, MinRisk versus MinLength criterion saves 994 people for every
11 kilometres per truck on the average. Although the average of achievement
and trade-off values per truck are as stated above, the average achievement
and trade-off values differ for the shipments originating from different supply
points.
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50R/50L vs. Min Length Min Risk vs. Min Length
Supply
People Extra Km People Extra Km
ALÝAGA
600
(max:10298)
1.022
(max:10)
767
(max:10298)
5.9
(max:125)
AMBARLI
149
(max:4499)
0.470
(max:17)
150
(max:4499)
0.6
(max:17)
DERÝNCE
296
(max:10794)
1.106
(max:76)
602
(max:6594)
8.4
(max:200)
KIRIKKALE
2783
(max:65012)
5.596
(max:135)
3769
(max:20870)
24.8
(max:114)
TRABZON
862
(max:10963)
3.300
(max:42)
1203
(max:10963)
38.0
(max:258)
SAMSUN
260
(max:30835)
1.169
(max:152)
4964
(max:23958)
128.9
(max:337)
HOPA
5601
(max:29264)
23.299
(max:146)
5605
(max:29264)
34.7
(max:146)
ATAS
678
(max:15399)
0.783
(max:14)
1049
(max:15399)
5.9
(max:350)
ANTALYA 0 0.000
78
(max:2684)
0.9
(max:22)
Table 5-4: Achievement and Trade-off Results per Truck
As presented in Table 5-4 above, there is an interesting result for the
shipments originating from two distinct supply points AMBARLI and HOPA.
Although the number of people that could be saved from potential risk is
nearly the same for %50Risk - %50Length and Minimum Risk results, the
extra kms that must be traded is lower in %50Risk - %50Length criterion.
 5.4 Use of Black Spots
In this section, we investigate the “accidental risk” of the Shell-shipments
based on a particular routing strategy, in order to analyze the transportation
risk from a different point of view. We analyze whether Shell trucks pass
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along the “dangerous roads”, namely Black Spots that are identified by the
Turkish Government.
Black Spots are certain segments of the highway network in Turkey, on which
the traffic accident occurrence frequency is defined to be “high” by the
General Directorate of Highways (GDH). Some of the black spots are as
follows:
1. Road segment connecting Istanbul Bosphorus Bridge to Ýzmit
2. Road segment crossing Bolu Mountain
3. Road segment between Ürgüp and Kayseri-West
4. Çesme-Ýzmir road
According to the Black Spots Map of Turkey, which is provided on the GDH
internet web site, we associated 71 links as “dangerous roads” on our road
network.
Given the results of Minimum Length, Minimum Risk and %50Risk -
%50Length paths, we analyze the usage of the black spots like the following:
Out of 71 dangerous links, shipments based on Minimum Risk routing
criterion uses 63 links with a total of 23,721 trucks traversed (Mean:334;
Max:3024) along the links. We observe that, all 63 of the links are inevitably
used in MinRisk criterion since these links are also used in the Minimum
Length routing criterion, which means that the links correspond to similar
paths resulted in both MinLength and MinRisk strategies for particular
shipments.
In Minimum Length criterion, we have 69 links used out of 71 dangerous
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links, with a total of 24,347 trucks traversed (Mean:343; Max:3030). We
observe that 6 links that were not used in the MinRisk paths, were used in the
MinLength paths.
According to %50Risk - %50Length combination-based shipment results, we
have 68 links used in 71 dangerous links, where 3 of these links do not
correspond to links that possess similar shipments. The total number of trucks
that used these links are 23,940, where Mean:337 and Max: 3030.
Observe that, the usage of Black Spots results in the same fashion with our
Minimum Length, Minimum Risk and %50Risk-%50Length results, i.e. we
have the maximum usage of Black Spots in MinLength, the least usage in
MinRisk and nearly an average usage in %50Risk-%50Length results, by
chance.
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C h a p t e r  6
HAZARDOUS NETWORK DESIGN PROBLEM
In the previous chapters, we approached the hazmat transportation problem
from a new DM’s point of view, where the DM’s objectives are to minimize
both risk and cost of the hazmat transportation. In this chapter we will consider
a completely different scenario and propose three heuristics to solve that
hazmat transportation problem.
We approach the problem from the government’s point of view and adopt the
hazmat transportation model proposed by Kara and Verter (2000).
As explained in Chapter 3, Kara and Verter’s model incorporates the
behaviors of both the regulator and hazmat carrier companies. According to
the model, a regulator identifies the allowable links of the highway network
for hazmat transportation, where the hazmat carrier companies select the
shortest routes within the given network.
Once the hazmat carriers select a particular routing strategy, the government
evaluates total risk of the shipments and identifies the links to be closed to
hazmat traffic so as to force the hazmat carriers to select “safer” routes. This
model can be regarded as an iterative game, in which the action of each player
affects the behavior of the next player. Figure 6-1 depicts the dependent
situation of the government and the hazmat carrier companies in the hazardous
network design problem.
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Figure 6-1: Hazardous Network Design Problem
Kara and Verter propose a bilevel model to solve the problem, where the outer
problem belongs to the government and the inner problem belongs to the
hazmat carrier companies.
 6.1 The Original Mathematical Model (Kara & Verter, 2000)
Before we go through our proposed methodology to solve the hazardous
network design problem, we examine the structure of the original
mathematical model developed by Kara and Verter.
Recall that, ),( ANG =  is the existing network, where N denotes the set of
nodes and A denotes the set of road links (indexed by (i,j): i,j ÎN) that connect
the nodes. Let C (indexed by c) denote the set of all shipments across G. Each
shipment is characterized by its origin o(c): (oÎN) and destination d(c):
(dÎN) and the type of hazmat carried m(c). Let Z denote the set of population
Each
Carrier
Government
Minimize Total Risk (Selected Paths)
Design the  TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
Minimize Total Cost (Selected Paths)
Select   PATHS  over the TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
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centers (indexed by z) affected by the hazmat transportation activity.
The parameters of the problem are:
mz
ij
,r  the number of people in population center z exposed to a truck carrying
hazmat type m through link (i,j)
ijl      length of link (i,j)
cn      number of trucks used for shipment c
The decision variables are:
m
ijY   1 if link (i,j) is available for hazmat transportation of hazmat type m, 0
otherwise
c
ijX     1 if link (i,j) is used for shipment c, 0 otherwise.
The original hazardous network design problem is as follows:
(HND)
{ }1,0
min
ÎmijY
  å å å
Î Î ÎZz Aji Cc
c
ij
cmz
ij
c Xn
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)(,r
             Where cijX  solves:
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ij YX £                                   " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                       (3)
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       { }1,0ÎcijX                                     " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                       (4)
The inner problem is represented by (1)-(4). The binary decision variables of
the outer problem, mijY , constitute parameters for the inner problem. Given the
values of mijY , the inner problem boils down to a Minimum Cost Network Flow
Model. Constraints (2) are the flow balance constraints, whereas (3) ensures
that only the links made available by the government can be used by the
carriers.
The solution strategy to solve HND is via the representation of the inner
problem by the use of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Once the
m
ijY values are given, the inner problem is unimodular. Hence, the integrity
requirements (4) in the inner problem can be replaced by 0³cijX  without loss
of optimality. This enables us to represent the inner problem via KKT
conditions of its LP relaxation. The optimum solution to inner problem can be
obtained by solving the feasibility problem defined by (2), (3) and the
following set of constraints:
                                         0³cijX    " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                                      (4¢)
      0=+-+- cij
c
ij
c
j
c
iij
c vwwln l    " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                                       (5)
                                     0=cij
c
ij Xv    " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                                       (6)
                     ( ) 0)( =- cmijcijcij YXl    " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                                        (7)
             ,0³cijv  0³
c
ijl , 
c
iw  free   " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                                        (8)
The nonlinear constraints (6) and (7) can be linearized by taking advantage of
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the binary nature of cijX  and 
m
ijY . When R is a large number, the following
constitutes the linearization:
                               ( )cijcij XRv -£ 1   " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                                    (6¢)
               ( )[ ]cijcmijcij XYR --£ )(1l   " (i,j) ÎA, cÎC                                      (7¢)
Thus, the following model is equivalent to (HND):
(HND¢)   
{ }1,0
min
ÎmijY
  å å å
Î Î ÎZz Aji Cc
c
ij
cmz
ij
c Xn
),(
)(,r
       s.t. (2), (3), (4), (5), (6¢), (7¢), (8)
                 { }1,0)( ÎcmijY             " (i,j) ÎA, mÎM
The solution of the model prescribes the road network that should be available
to hazmat carriers as well as the carriers’ route choices on the network. The
corresponding objective function determines the minimum population
exposure attainable by banning certain road segments to hazmat vehicles.
Kara and Verter use HND¢ to design the hazardous network for South-
Western-Ontario. In our study we intend to determine the hazardous network
of petroleum products for Turkey by using HND¢. Hence we use the annual
shipment data of Shell to design our hazardous network.
In our earlier analysis we applied the original model HND¢ on our network,
670-arc and 499-node, via CPLEX 7.0 running on a 12*400 MHz computer
with 3GB of memory. However, we couldn’t be able to find any feasible
solution even after 300 hours. Therefore, we propose two “one-shot” and an
iterative heuristic solution methodology.
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 6.2 Our Approach
The size of the network in our problem constitutes a disadvantageous situation
while attempting to solve the problem optimally. Therefore, we seek sub-
optimal solutions in which computational time is at acceptable values.
To solve the hazmat transportation problem from a regulator’s point of view,
we propose two new approaches that are not iterative in nature but determines
quick solutions. Additionally, we present a greedy algorithm that seeks
solutions to design a hazardous network.
 6.2.1 First Approach: The Union of MinRisk Paths
We begin our analysis by first investigating whether the union of the
Minimum Risk Paths constitutes the allowable network for hazmat
transportation. The idea behind this consideration is: when all the links that are
other than the ones included in Minimum Risk Paths, are closed; will the
remaining network force the shipments select minimum risk paths?
We identified the union of Minimum Risk Paths for all 562 shipments using
GIS tools. The new network consists of 502 links, i.e. 168 links are closed to
hazmat traffic (We define the closed link set as K, K=(N,A)). According to this
approach ( K = 168), total path risk and total path length results are presented
in Table 6-1a and 6-1b respectively.
Note that we present the solutions of Minimum Length results of the new
network (502-arc) in Table 6-1 since all the shipments will be based on
selecting MinLength paths according to the bilevel model. We also present the
Minimum Length and Minimum Risk results of the original network (670-arc)
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for reference.
TOTAL PATH RISK (Truck-People)
U (MinRisk Paths) Original NetworkSupply
Min Length Min Length Min Risk
ALÝAGA 195,738,963 195,718,341 193,160,611
AMBARLI 402,961,163 403,451,512 402,953,384
DERÝNCE 342,942,875 341,032,680 338,377,090
KIRIKKALE 35,823,205 35,521,938 32,728,918
TRABZON 7,317,735 7,317,735 6,996,427
SAMSUN 20,662,113 20,662,113 18,612,010
HOPA 6,779,627 6,778,629 4,043,449
ATAS 39,548,680 40,245,728 39,382,299
ANTALYA 8,948,001 8,942,109 8,878,217
TOTAL 1,060,722,362 1,059,670,785 1,045,132,405
Table 6-1a: Comparison of Total Path Risk Results for the First Approach
TOTAL PATH LENGTH (Truck-Km)
U (MinRisk Paths) Original NetworkSupply
Min Length Min Length Min Risk
ALÝAGA 626,856 626,294 646,001
AMBARLI 184,562 182,881 184,834
DERÝNCE 647,631 628,517 665,397
KIRIKKALE 204,665 200,260 218,624
TRABZON 38,102 38,102 48,249
SAMSUN 138,774 138,744 191,962
HOPA 56,030 55,907 72,832
ATAS 230,656 228,687 233,509
ANTALYA 88,368 88,208 88,956
TOTAL 2,215,644 2,187,600 2,350,364
Table 6-1b: Comparison of Total Path Length Results for the First Approach
As seen in Table 6-1a, the new network does not force the shipments to follow
Minimum Risk Paths. Moreover, most of the shipments originating from
different supply points followed the paths that pose more risk than Minimum
Length Paths do in the original network.
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Tables 6-1a and 6-1b identify an important result: Imposing a network which
contains only these arcs for MinRisk routes (with a hope that the paths
selected by the carriers will again be a MinRisk path) provides even more risk
than the original network.
When we observe supply point-based shipments, all the shipments except the
ones originating from AMBARLI and ATAS, have a greater risk value than
the original Minimum Length total-risk results. Although there may be “good”
solutions for the shipments originating from the supply points other than
AMBARLI and ATAS, we focus on these two supply points.
In order to improve the solution, we identify the links that were closed by the
effect of the shipments originating from AMBARLI and ATAS. Hence, we
only have 11 arcs to be closed to hazmat traffic by the effect of the shipments
belonging AMBARLI and ATAS, which also allows other supply point-based
shipments follow MinLength routes. Note that the identified 11 links do not
intersect with the MinLength routes of the other 7 supply point based
shipments.
We now investigate whether we would get a better solution when we redefine
our closed link set with these 11 new arcs. Our new results are the following
for the new closed link set K, where K = 11 are presented in Table 6-2.
The corrected network of union of MinRisk paths has a better result than the
previous network, with a 1,303,369 truck-people of achievement and 6031
truck-kms of trade-off. However, the results indicate that closing supply point-
based links do not yield the results we expected.
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Observe that AMBARLI and ATAS had better results in the previous network
although we closed the same links associated with these supply points in the
corrected network. Moreover the other supply points were projected to select
Minimum Length paths but quite interestingly ALÝAGA, DERÝNCE and
KIRIKKALE based shipments have better results now.
Corrected Network (11-arc closed)
Supply
Total Risk Total Length
ALÝAGA 195,636,140 626,781
AMBARLI 402,968,854 184,447
DERÝNCE 340,794,330 631,432
KIRIKKALE 35,487,586 200,334
TRABZON 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 20,662,113 138,774
HOPA 6,778,629 55,907
ATAS 39,774,028 229,486
ANTALYA 8,948,001 88,368
TOTAL 1,058,367,416 2,193,631
Table 6-2: Total Path Length and Risk Results for the 11-arc Closed Network
When we observe particular shipment results for two new network designs, we
see that there are distinct shipments, originating from different supply points,
whose mutually competitive paths have common links. These links may or
may not be regarded in the closed link set due to their relative achievement
and trade-off values. To illustrate this situation with specific examples we
determine the following:
Case 1: Links 357 and 358 lie on Minimum Risk paths  of four shipments
(Antalya-Burdur, Antalya-Denizli, Antalya-Milas and Antalya-Bodrum) which
originate from ANTALYA and Minimum Length paths  of shipments
(Kirikkale-Marmaris and Kirikkale-Bodrum) originating from KIRIKKALE.
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According to our first consideration, which is designing a network that
consists of union of MinRisk paths, we should close these two links. This
means that shipments originating from ANTALYA will select MinLength
paths and the shipments originating form KIRIKKALE will select some thk
shortest paths. This will bring out an exposure value of 765,265 truck-people
in total.
Allowing these two links remain open yields a different result. This time,
when both links are open, shipments originating from both of the supply points
will select MinLength paths. This will result in 756,583 truck-people, which is
lower than the previous result. Therefore, the reliability of the network that
consists of the union of minimum risk paths is questionable.
Let us now consider another example, which describes the complexity of the
situation from a different angle.
Case 2: Links 379 and 389 lie on Minimum Length paths of shipments
(Antalya-Denizli, Antalya-Milas and Antalya-Bodrum) originating from
ANTALYA and Minimum Risk path of shipment (Kirikkale-Marmaris)
originating from KIRIKKALE.
When both links are closed to hazmat traffic, there will be a total exposure
value of 314,523 truck-people, whereas the risk value will be 319,158 truck-
people in the opposite situation.
In both cases, we have different links but the same shipments. In Case 1, we
observed how these shipments may produce confusing results. Nevertheless,
in Case-2 we see that the same shipments bring out completely reasonable
values when the network of the union of MinRisk paths is of concern. This
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implies the complexity of the problem clearly.
 6.2.2 Second Approach
Our second approach to this problem evolves from our observations in the first
trial. This time we take both the Minimum Risk and Minimum Length paths
into consideration. We examine whether closing links that are within the union
of the MinLength paths that do not intersect with the union of the MinRisk
paths, will result in better solutions. The shaded area in Figure 6-2 indicates
the links to be closed to hazmat traffic within this approach. The difference of
this approach from the first one is remaining the links open, which do not
intersect with both MinLength or MinRisk paths in the hazardous network.
Figure 6-2: MinRisk and MinLength Paths over the Network G
According to this consideration, we have 40 links to be closed to hazmat
traffic. While K =40, Minimum Risk and Minimum Length path results are in
Table 6-3a and 6-3b respectively.
In Table 6-3a, observe that we again have a better result in the original
Minimum Length path results than in our new hazardous network with
G
MR = U (MinRisk Paths)
G = (N,A)
MR
ML = U (MinLength Paths)
ML
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K =40. It can be seen that shipments originating from supply points
ALÝAGA, AMBARLI and ATAS have better results, while the rest of the
shipments have results which are the same with the original Minimum Length
results or greater than that.
TOTAL PATH RISK (Truck-People)
40-arc closed
Network
Original Network
Supply
Min Length Min Length Min Risk
ALÝAGA 195,636,140 195,718,341 193,160,611
AMBARLI 402,968,854 403,451,512 402,953,384
DERÝNCE 342,388,055 341,032,680 338,377,090
KIRIKKALE 35,801,146 35,521,938 32,728,918
TRABZON 7,317,735 7,317,735 6,996,427
SAMSUN 20,662,113 20,662,113 18,612,010
HOPA 6,779,627 6,778,629 4,043,449
ATAS 39,824,925 40,245,728 39,382,299
ANTALYA 8,948,001 8,942,109 8,878,217
TOTAL 1,060,326,596 1,059,670,785 1,045,132,405
Table 6-3a: Comparison of Total Path Risk Results for the Second Approach
TOTAL PATH LENGTH (Truck-Km)
40-arc closed
Network Original NetworkSupply
Min Length Min Length Min Risk
ALÝAGA 626,781 626,294 646,001
AMBARLI 184,447 182,881 184,834
DERÝNCE 645,194 628,517 665,397
KIRIKKALE 204,613 200,260 218,624
TRABZON 38,102 38,102 48,249
SAMSUN 138,774 138,744 191,962
HOPA 56,030 55,907 72,832
ATAS 230,067 228,687 233,509
ANTALYA 88,368 88,208 88,956
TOTAL 2,212,346 2,187,600 2,350,364
Table 6-3b: Comparison of Total Path Length Results for the Second Approach
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In Table 6-3b, we have the total path length results, which indicate that most
of the shipments selected some thk shortest paths in the existing network.
We follow the same procedure as we did in our first approach, we select the
shipments that originate from different supply points, which have better results
than Minimum Length path results. The corresponding supply points are,
ALÝAGA, AMBARLI and ATAS.The shipments that originate from these
supply points contributed the risk reduction process with 9 links. Therefore we
change the closed link set to K = 9. After closing these links, we have a better
result, however we again have the same problem, namely mutually
competitive paths dilemma, which we confronted in our first approach.
The results of the corrected network are as follows:
Corrected Network-2 (9-arc closed)
Supply
Total Risk Total Length
ALÝAGA 195,636,140 626,781
AMBARLI 402,968,854 184,447
DERÝNCE 340,794,330 631,432
KIRIKKALE 35,521,938 200,260
TRABZON 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 20,662,113 138,774
HOPA 6,778,629 55,907
ATAS 40,245,728 228,687
ANTALYA 8,948,001 88,368
TOTAL 1,058,873,468 2,192,758
Table 6-4: Total Path Length and Risk Results for the Corrected Network of the Second Approach
We have an achievement of 797,317 truck-people and a trade-off value of
5,158 truck-km in this approach. The achievement of the first approach is
better than the second one.
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 6.2.3 A Greedy Approach
In this section, we present an iterative approach to design a hazardous
network. Although we have a 670-arc 499-node network, which requires
6702 number of iterations to find an optimal solution; we take iterations for a
number of network designs so as to find the hazardous network that results in
the least total path risk value.
We begin our analysis by closing a link set including 10 links, which we select
among all 670 arcs in the original network. Once we get a result from this
network design, we update the closed link set with additional 10 links and do
the iteration for the new network.
Before we proceed our iteration results, we go through how we determine the
priority of the links to be added in the closed link set. We define the priority of
a link to be closed by a ratio, as follows:
                                                       
ij
ij
ij
l
r
a =  , " (i,j)
where  ijl  is the length and ijr is the population exposure value of link (i,j).
The reason we define such a ratio is to give the priority to the links that
possess the most number of people per km.
Our iterations are initialized by closing the first 10 links that suffice Min{ ija }
requirement and we continue iterating by updating the closed link set by
adding the next 10 Min{ ija }s until we determine the maximum number of
links we are allowed to close simultaneously.
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It takes 3 minutes for a single run, i.e. calculating shortest paths for 562
shipments, using ArcView GIS 3.1, running on a Pentium-III PC at 700 Mhz
with 128 MB of memory.
We have 67 iterations, which resulted surprisingly, i.e. all the set of closed
links except two, caused a disconnection in the network. The first three set of
links disconnect the network when each of them are considered separately.
The 4th set of links give a positive result, however the next 30 set of links
disconnect the network, when one of them is considered with set-4
simultaneously. The only set combination, which is #4 and #35 combined,
give a positive result in our all 67 iterations. The results of these iterations are
worse than our first two approach, which are also presented in Table 6-5
below:
Iteration-1 (10-arc closed) Iteration-2 (20-arc closed)
Supply Total Risk Total Length Total Risk Total Length
ALÝAGA 196,423,270 654,742 196,464,296 654,744
AMBARLI 404,658,067 183,004 404,658,067 183,004
DERINCE 388,640,103 846,417 388,640,103 846,417
KIRIKKALE 36,210,612 202,337 34,930,037 205,416
TRABZON 7,317,735 38,102 7,381,207 39,143
SAMSUN 20,662,113 138,744 19,186,508 191,405
HOPA 6,778,629 55,907 6,780,196 56,320
ATAS 40,246,932 228,706 40,246,932 228,706
ANTALYA 8,963,009 88,532 8,963,009 88,532
1,109,900,470 2,436,491 1,107,250,355 2,493,687
Table 6-5: Iteration Results for the Greedy Approach
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When we analyze the usage of links in the original network, we see that %72
of all 670 links are used in the Minimum Risk paths and %78 of the links are
used in the Minimum Length paths.
For the sake of reducing the complexity of the problem, we narrow our search
space by eliminating some of the links from candidacy, despite the fact that the
objective function may increase. We seek possible extensions of our second
heuristic, namely use of 40-arc closed network. The common property of these
40 links is; they are used in some MinLength paths, which do not intersect
with MinRisk paths.
We do the iterations in the same fashion, except that this time we close the
links one by one; i.e. initialize by closing the link that suffices Min{ ija }
requirement and continue iterating by updating the closed link set with the
next Min{ ija } until all 40 links are closed. The results of 40 iterations are
presented in Table 6-6 and the results of total population exposure for each run
is plotted in a graph in Figure 6-3.
From the Table 6-6, we observe that there is a 569,149 truck-people of
difference between the first and the last iteration. The best result is achieved at
the 37th iteration with a minor difference (19,753 truck-people) from the total
risk result of the MinLength paths of the original network (670-arc). It is
trivial to infer that the results of the first two heuristics in sections 1 and 2 are
better than the results of this approach.
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Itera-
tion
# of
links
closed
Total Risk
(Truck-People)
Total
Length
(Truck-
Km)
Itera-
tion
# of
links
closed
Total Risk
(Truck-People)
Total
Length
(Truck-
Km)
1 1 1,060,895,745 2,187,696 21 21 1,060,241,547 2,199,667
2 2 1,060,877,340 2,187,723 22 22 1,060,241,547 2,199,667
3 3 1,060,790,580 2,186,781 23 23 1,060,241,547 2,199,667
4 4 1,060,761,978 2,187,086 24 24 1,060,241,547 2,199,667
5 5 1,060,054,568 2,188,113 25 25 1,060,312,104 2,199,927
6 6 1,061,130,591 2,193,097 26 26 1,060,173,800 2,200,473
7 7 1,060,892,241 2,196,012 27 27 1,060,173,800 2,200,473
8 8 1,060,823,453 2,196,893 28 28 1,060,173,800 2,200,473
9 9 1,060,880,233 2,197,689 29 29 1,060,348,184 2,200,630
10 10 1,060,880,233 2,197,689 30 30 1,060,271,875 2,201,277
11 11 1,060,832,878 2,197,729 31 31 1,061,034,017 2,207,777
12 12 1,060,832,878 2,197,729 32 32 1,061,034,017 2,207,777
13 13 1,060,832,878 2,197,729 33 33 1,061,027,765 2,208,025
14 14 1,060,832,878 2,197,729 34 34 1,061,027,765 2,208,025
15 15 1,060,832,878 2,198,729 35 35 1,061,253,485 2,210,889
16 16 1,060,832,878 2,198,729 36 36 1,061,253,485 2,210,889
17 17 1,060,265,834 2,199,299 37 37 1,059,651,032 2,212,274
18 18 1,060,272,084 2,199,343 38 38 1,060,326,596 2,212,346
19 19 1,060,272,084 2,199,343 39 39 1,060,326,596 2,212,346
20 20 1,060,262,949 2,199,393 40 40 1,060,326,596 2,212,346
Table 6-6: Total Risk and Total Km Results for 40 Iterations
Figure 6-3: Total Risk Results for 40 Iterations
One possible correction strategy for this approach can be done by eliminating
1 0 5 8 5 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 5 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 5 9 5 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 6 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 6 1 5 0 0 0 0 0
1 4 7 1 0 1 3 1 6 1 9 2 2 2 5 2 8 3 1 3 4 3 7 4 0
Tota l  R i sk  (Truck-Peop le )
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the links that caused an increase of the total risk value comparing to that of the
previous iteration, although we know that all the iterations yield unique results
given a closed link set. Because, a link that causes an increase in a total risk
value may or may not give better results when we exclude that link from the
closed link set.
The link set that cause a decrease in the total risk values of particular iterations
consists of 14 links. When we close only these links we have the following
results:
14-arc closed network
Supply Total Risk Total Length
ALÝAGA 195,636,140 626,781
AMBARLI 403,346,347 182,966
DERINCE 340,493,110 632,913
KIRIKKALE 34,934,214 201,603
TRABZON 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 20,662,113 138,744
HOPA 6,779,627 56,030
ATAS 39,678,684 229,257
ANTALYA 8,948,001 88,368
1,057,795,971 2,194,764
Table 6-7: Results of the 14-arc Closed Network
As seen in Table 6-7, we have better results now. Moreover, these results are
better than our first two approach.
We do further analysis to improve the above results. We again focus on
specific supply point-based shipments, specially AMBARLI and HOPA. We
question whether we already closed the links that cause a decrease in the total
risk results of the shipments, which originate from AMBARLI and HOPA.
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After investigating the network thoroughly, we see that there may be a
possible reduction in the total risk when we close some additional links which
are mostly associated with the two origins. We determine 7 more links that can
be closed to hazmat traffic in addition to 14 links.
These results are presented in the following table:
21-arc closed network
Supply Total Risk Total Length
ALÝAGA 195,636,140 626,781
AMBARLI 402,968,854 184,447
DERINCE 340,493,110 632,913
KIRIKKALE 34,934,214 201,603
TRABZON 7,087,512 38,983
SAMSUN 20,662,113 138,744
HOPA 5,834,627 57,528
ATAS 39,678,684 229,257
ANTALYA 8,948,001 88,368
1,056,243,255 2,198,624
Table 6-8: Results of the 21-arc Closed Network
Seven more links affected our results in a better way; we have better results for
the shipments originating from AMBARLI and HOPA, and even we have a
better result now for TRABZON-based shipments.
Our final results indicate that we have an achievement of 3,427,530 truck-
people in comparison to the Minimum Risk results of the original network.
We know that there is a total achievement of 14,538,380 truck-people in the
original network, which is the difference of the total risk results of MinLength
and MinRisk paths. ¨
To summarize this chapter we have the following remarks: The hazmat
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transportation problem that requires closing certain links of the network to
hazmat traffic is quite complex in nature and highly depends on the spatial
distribution of the o-d pairs, the magnitude of the shipments in terms of trucks
as well as the geographical positions of the o-d pairs and the demographic
situations of their corresponding divisions.
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C h a p t e r  7
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we will provide a brief summary of the contributions of this
thesis and address some possible extensions of this study for future research.
In our study, we focus on hazmat transportation problem from two Decision
Maker’s point of view.
The first problem belongs to a petroleum products producer and supplier
company (Shell), which does not involve in the hazmat transportation
physically, but hires sub-contractor firms to do the transportation for Shell. In
the second problem, which is the hazardous network design problem , our
approach is however, from a regulator’s point of view unlike our first
consideration, using the annual shipment data of Shell. In this problem, we
propose alternative solution methodology to bring sub-optimal solutions to
Kara and Verter’s (2000) bilevel model.
In the first hazmat transportation problem, we bring solutions to suit Shell’s
needs and requirements by using real data. During our study, we have
discovered a new Decision-Maker type that has been neglected in the hazmat
literature. This new DM type enabled us to solve the hazmat transportation
problem of a hazmat producer & supplier company in a justifiable manner.
With this large-scale implementation, we derived various alternative routing
strategies to be selected by the company representatives. During our recent
discussions with Shell, it has been stated that %50Risk-%50Length routing
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strategy best suits their purposes and some of their current routes already
match with the results from %50Risk-%50Length routing consideration. Their
feedback regarding the improvement of this study led us to address some
future research directions as follows:
We have used the population exposure, as a risk definition. However, there
may also be another approach by making use of a risk model that includes
accident probabilities to determine hazardous routes. Solving this hazmat
transportation problem with various risk definitions, would bring interesting
results and allow possible comparisons while making routing decisions. One
possible extension for the GIS applications would be using a more sensitive
population data, which includes the districts within cities. This may bring
more accurate solutions while attempting to calculate population exposure
values as arc impedances.
Our second approach to the hazmat transportation problem is the hazardous
network design. The original model to solve hazardous network design
problem belongs to Kara and Verter (2000), where the authors provide an
optimal solution for South-Western Ontario. We adopted their model,
however, we propose three alternative heuristics to bring solutions to this
problem.
We derived our best results from a corrected extension of the iterative
approach, where we close 21 arcs to hazmat traffic in the transportation
network. We discuss the complexity of the problem extensively and infer that
the complexity of the problem depends on the spatial distribution of the origin-
destination pairs, the magnitude of the shipments and the size of the
transportation network.
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To address some possible future research directions to solve this very new
model, we think that determining new heuristics or attaining powerful
linearizations for the original mathematical model to derive optimal solutions
in a reasonable CPU time, would bring better results.
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Minimum Risk Minimum Length
Supply
Truck-People Truck-Km Truck-People Truck-Km
ALÝAGA 193,160,611 646,001 195,718,341 626,294
AMBARLI 402,953,384 184,834 403,451,512 182,881
DERINCE 338,377,090 665,397 341,032,680 628,517
KIRIKKALE 32,728,918 218,624 35,521,938 200,260
TRABZON 6,996,427 48,249 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 18,612,010 191,962 20,662,113 138,744
HOPA 4,043,449 72,832 6,778,629 55,907
ATAS 39,382,299 233,509 40,245,728 228,687
ANTALYA 8,878,217 88,956 8,942,109 88,208
1,045,132,405 2,350,364 1,059,670,785 2,187,600
Table A-1: Minimum Risk and Minimum Length Results
%75Risk-%25Length %25Risk-%75Length
Supply
Truck-People Truck-Km Truck-People Truck-Km
ALÝAGA 193,377,479 635,141 194,332,540 626,986
AMBARLI 402,954,934 184,446 403,346,347 182,966
DERINCE 338,626,382 646,552 340,679,227 629,059
KIRIKKALE 32,811,366 212,210 33,741,943 202,712
TRABZON 7,078,508 39,075 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 18,996,600 161,710 20,647,245 138,767
HOPA 4,045,563 67,277 5,833,629 57,405
ATAS 39,392,461 232,762 39,706,756 229,185
ANTALYA 8,883,061 88,705 8,942,109 88,208
1,046,166,354 2,267,878 1,054,547,531 2,193,390
Table A-2: %75Risk-%25Length and %25Risk-%75Length Results
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%90Risk-%10Length %10Risk-%90Length
Supply
Truck-People Truck-Km Truck-People Truck-Km
ALÝAGA 193,220,988 638,904 194,336,728 626,971
AMBARLI 402,953,552 184,512 403,364,754 182,939
DERINCE 338,616,534 646,859 340,967,920 628,559
KIRIKKALE 32,765,712 213,163 35,474,583 200,300
TRABZON 7,078,508 39,075 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 18,882,520 166,431 20,662,113 138,744
HOPA 4,045,563 67,277 6,778,629 55,907
ATAS 39,387,447 232,959 40,245,728 228,687
ANTALYA 8,878,217 88,956 8,942,109 88,208
1,045,829,041 2,278,136 1,058,090,299 2,188,417
Table A-3: %90Risk-%10Length and %10Risk-%90Length Results
%80Risk-%20Length %20Risk-%80Length
Supply
Truck-People Truck-Km Truck-People Truck-Km
ALÝAGA 193,377,479 635,141 194,332,540 626,986
AMBARLI 402,954,936 184,446 403,346,347 182,966
DERINCE 338,626,382 646,552 340,788,070 628,820
KIRIKKALE 32,811,366 212,210 34,216,989 201,775
TRABZON 7,078,508 39,075 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 18,923,521 163,760 20,647,245 138,767
HOPA 4,045,563 67,277 5,833,629 57,405
ATAS 39,389,582 232,839 40,245,728 228,687
ANTALYA 8,883,061 88,705 8,942,109 88,208
1,046,090,398 2,270,005 1,055,670,392 2,191,716
Table A-4: %80Risk-%20Length and %20Risk-%80Length Results
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%70Risk-%30Length %30Risk-%70Length
Supply
Truck-People Truck-Km Truck-People Truck-Km
ALÝAGA 193,377,479 635,141 194,175,862 627,408
AMBARLI 402,954,936 184,446 403,346,349 182,966
DERINCE 338,626,382 646,552 340,403,710 629,783
KIRIKKALE 32,811,366 212,210 33,741,943 202,712
TRABZON 7,078,508 39,075 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 18,923,521 163,760 20,647,245 138,767
HOPA 4,045,563 67,277 5,833,629 57,405
ATAS 39,389,582 232,839 39,706,756 229,185
ANTALYA 8,883,061 88,705 8,942,109 88,208
1,046,090,398 2,270,005 1,054,115,338 2,194,536
Table A-5: %70Risk-%30Length and %30Risk-%70Length Results
%60Risk-%40Length %40Risk-%60Length
Supply
Truck-People Truck-Km Truck-People Truck-Km
ALÝAGA 193,716,312 629,703 194,175,862 627,408
AMBARLI 402,954,936 184,446 403,346,349 182,966
DERINCE 339,676,336 633,880 340,403,710 629,783
KIRIKKALE 32,962,125 209,647 33,741,943 202,712
TRABZON 7,080,604 39,038 7,317,735 38,102
SAMSUN 19,856,934 145,512 20,647,245 138,767
HOPA 4,045,563 67,277 5,833,629 57,405
ATAS 39,456,616 231,426 39,706,756 229,185
ANTALYA 8,883,061 88,705 8,942,109 88,208
1,048,632,487 2,229,634 1,054,115,338 2,194,536
Table A-6: %60Risk-%40Length and %40Risk-%60Length Results
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Figure B-1: Trade-off Curve
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Figure C-1: Kirikkale-Mugla Shipment
1075 Km, 97331 People 925 Km, 100045 People
Minimum Length Minimum Risk
KIRIKKALE-MUGLA SHIPMENT
919 Km, 104717 People 1127 Km, 97255 People
%90Risk-%10Length %50Risk-%50Length
Kirikkale
Mugla
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Figure C-2: Aliaga-Denizli Shipment
Figure C-2: Aliaga-Denizli Shipment
Figure C-3: Hopa-Gümüshane Shipment
Minimum Length Minimum Risk
ALÝAGA-DENÝZLÝ SHIPMENT
401 Km, 84461 People 412 Km, 82337 People
Aliaga
Denizli
Minimum Length %40Risk-60LengthMinimum Risk
HOPA-GÜMÜSHANE SHIPMENT
286 Km, 47154 People 335 Km, 33465 People432 Km, 17890 People
Hopa
Gümüshane
